Security in Operation
This section addresses actions and settings with security-related implications.
>Making Luna Network HSM 7 PQC Safe
>Security Effects of Administrative Actions
Refer also to Security of Your Partition Challenge.
Making Luna Network HSM 7 PQC Safe
Strengthening Luna Network HSM 7 Against Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Threats
The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) threat occurs when attackers collect encrypted data today with the intention of decrypting it in the future using more powerful computing capabilities, potentially including quantum computers.
To help reduce this risk, you can configure supported Luna Network HSM 7 capabilities to use post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This includes cryptographic key cloning, client-to-appliance communication over NTLS, SSH access, and REST API configuration.
The following sections outline the available options, the required software versions, and the steps to enable PQC-capable algorithms in supported configurations.
Secure Cryptographic Key Cloning with PQC
When multiple Network HSMs share a domain key, cryptographic objects can be cloned between them. Starting with Luna HSM Firmware 7.9.0 and Luna HSM Client 10.9.0, you can use ML-KEM-based cipher suites to strengthen the protection of key material during cloning. This enables you to adopt quantum-resistant key-establishment mechanisms for supported cloning operations while continuing to use your existing HSM deployment model.
Supported ML-KEM-based cloning cipher suites
The following suites are available:
| Cipher suite | Encryption and integrity protection |
|---|---|
| ECDSA-P521-SHA2-512 ECDH-P521-ML-KEM1024-SHA2-512-AES-256-GCM | AES-256-GCM |
| ECDSA-P521-SHA2-512 ECDH-P521-ML-KEM1024-SHA2-512-AES-256-CTR-HMAC-SHA2-512 | AES-256-CTR with HMAC-SHA2-512 |
| ECDSA-BP512-SHA2-512 ECDH-BP512-ML-KEM1024-SHA2-512-AES-256-GCM | AES-256-GCM |
| ECDSA-BP512-SHA2-512 ECDH-BP512-ML-KEM1024-SHA2-512-AES-256-CTR-HMAC-SHA2-512 | AES-256-CTR with HMAC-SHA2-512 |
| ECDSA-P521-SHA3-512 ECDH-P521-ML-KEM1024-SHA3-512-AES-256-GCM | AES-256-GCM |
| ECDSA-P521-SHA3-512 ECDH-P521-ML-KEM1024-SHA3-512-AES-256-CTR-HMAC-SHA3-512 | AES-256-CTR with HMAC-SHA3-512 |
| ECDSA-BP512-SHA3-512 ECDH-BP512-ML-KEM1024-SHA3-512-AES-256-GCM | AES-256-GCM |
| ECDSA-BP512-SHA3-512 ECDH-BP512-ML-KEM1024-SHA3-512-AES-256-CTR-HMAC-SHA3-512 | AES-256-CTR with HMAC-SHA3-512 |
The first cipher suite listed is the default starting with Luna HSM Firmware 7.9.0.
To configure PQC-capable cloning
1. Open lunacm and log in as the Partition Security Officer:
lunacm:> role login-name <role>
2.Review the applicable cipher IDs and disable the non-PQC options (IDs 0–8, as specified for your configuration) using:
lunacm:> partition cipherdisable -id <cipher id>
The command output confirms when a cipher has been successfully disabled:
lunacm:> partition cid -id 0 CPv3 RSA-4096-PKCS-SHA2-384 AES-256-GCM is now disabled Command Result : No Error
3.Select the supported options that meet your security and interoperability requirements, and enable them using their corresponding cipher IDs.
lunacm:> partition cipherenable -id <cipher id>
4.Confirm that cloning succeeds between the intended HSMs and that the selected cipher suites are supported by the installed firmware and client versions.
For detailed command syntax, refer to the Luna HSM Firmware 7.9.0 and Luna HSM Client 10.9.0 documentation.
Strengthen Client-to-HSM Communication Using PQC-Enabled NTLS
The Luna Universal Client communicates with Luna Network HSM using NTLS. Supported configurations allow you to specify PQC-capable TLS groups for this communication, helping you prepare your HSM environment for future quantum-related threats.
Prerequisites
>Luna Appliance Software 7.9.1 or later.
>Luna HSM Client 10.9.2 or later.
To configure PQC-capable TLS groups
1.Connect to the Luna Network HSM appliance using lunash.
2.Configure the required TLS groups:
lunash:> sysconf tls groups set -list <group_list>
[aa2894] lunash:>sysconf tls groups set -list X25519MLKEM768:MLKEM1024
This operation will set the TLS groups to use the following groups:
Configured Groups
--------------------------------------------------
X25519MLKEM768
MLKEM1024
This operation will restart TLS related services (NTLS, STCD, CBS).
Type 'proceed' to set groups and restart TLS related services, or 'quit'
to quit now. > proceed
Restarting NTLS, STC and CBS services.... Done
Command Result : 0 (Success)
[aa2894] lunash:>
3.Review the proposed configuration and confirm the operation by entering proceed when prompted.
NOTE The configuration change restarts TLS-related services, including NTLS, STC, and CBS. Schedule this operation during an appropriate maintenance window and verify that connected applications can re-establish their sessions afterward.
For additional details, refer to the Luna Appliance Software 7.9.1 and Luna HSM Client 10.9.2 documentation.
Use PQC-Enabled SSH for Appliance Administration
SSH access to Luna Network HSM 7 is enhanced to support PQC starting with Luna Appliance Software 7.9.1.
Where supported by the client and appliance configuration, you can specify the ML-KEM-based key-exchange algorithm when connecting to the appliance.
To connect using PQC-enabled SSH
Run the following command from a compatible SSH client:
ssh -o KexAlgorithms=mlkem768x25519-sha256 admin@<Luna Network HSM IP>
Replace <Luna Network HSM IP> with the address of your appliance.
Verify that the SSH client supports the specified key-exchange algorithm and that the connection negotiates the intended algorithm. Existing SSH configurations may need adjustment if they rely on legacy algorithms.
Configure PQC-Capable TLS Groups Through the REST API
For environments that use automation or centralized configuration management, the Luna Network HSM REST interface provides an API action to configure the default TLS group list.
Use the following endpoint:
POST /api/lunasa/webServer/actions/{actionid}
Set the action ID to:
setDefaultGroupList
Provide the TLS group configuration using the request format and parameters defined in the REST API documentation for your installed appliance version.
This approach can help you incorporate PQC-related TLS configuration into repeatable deployment and administration workflows. After applying the change, verify the resulting configuration and confirm that the relevant services and client connections operate as expected.
Tamper Events
Luna Network HSM 7 detects hardware anomalies (such as card over-temperature)
If Policy 48: Do Controlled Tamper Recovery is enabled (the default), the HSM SO must clear the tamper condition before the HSM is reset, to return the HSM to normal operation (see HSM Capabilities and Policies). While the HSM is in the tamper condition, only the subset of
You can enable Policy 40: Decommission on Tamper to decommission the HSM when a tamper event occurs, so that partitions and roles are deleted from the HSM. By default, Policy 40: Decommission on Tamper is disabled, and the contents of the HSM are not affected by the tamper event.
If both policies are disabled, the HSM sends a warning when a tamper event occurs but does not make partition data inaccessible. We do not recommend disabling both policies.
If both policies are enabled, the HSM SO role is deleted when a tamper event occurs, so you do not need to log in this role to clear the tamper condition.
There are several conditions that can result in a tamper event. The tamper state is indicated by the HSM Tamper State field in the output of lunash:> hsm show. If tamper events have been detected and not cleared, the field will read Tamper(s) detected. Use lunash:>hsm tamper show to view detailed information for the tamper event, including whether it requires an HSM reset in addition to a tamper clear.
NOTE A tamper event resets the HSM hardware, including the PCIe logic. This prevents the HSM from reporting any statuses, including the cause of the tamper condition. The only thing which is detected in this case is k7pf0: ALM0015: PCIe Link Failure. The HSM must be rebooted before the cause of the tamper event can be reported.
| Tamper event | Response |
|---|---|
| Chassis intrusion |
Halt the HSM. Deactivate activated partitions. Decommission the HSM if policy 40: Decommission on Tamper is enabled. |
| Card removal |
Halt the HSM. Deactivate activated partitions. Decommission the HSM if policy 40: Decommission on Tamper is enabled. |
| Over/under temperature |
Halt the HSM. Deactivate activated partitions. Decommission the HSM if policy 40: Decommission on Tamper is enabled. Warnings are logged for mild over/under temperature events. Warnings are self-clearing if the condition is resolved. |
| Over/under voltage |
Halt the HSM. Deactivate activated partitions. Decommission the HSM if policy 40: Decommission on Tamper is enabled. Warnings are logged for mild over/under voltage events. Warnings are self-clearing if the condition is resolved. |
| Battery removal/depletion |
Halt the HSM. Deactivate activated partitions. Decommission the HSM. Warnings are logged for low battery conditions. |
Recovering from a Tamper Event
How you recover from a tamper event depends on how the following HSM policies are set. See HSM Capabilities and Policies for more information:
| Policy 40: Decommission on tamper | If enabled, the HSM is decommissioned when a tamper event occurs. You must clear the tamper condition before you can re-initialize the HSM SO, re-create your partitions, restore the partition contents from backup, and re-initialize the partition roles (Partition SO, Crypto Officer, and Crypto User, and Audit, as relevant). |
| Policy 48: Do Controlled Tamper Recovery | If enabled, the tamper condition that halted the HSM must be cleared by the HSM SO (by issuing the tamper clear command), before the HSM can be reset to resume normal operations. |
Activation and auto-activation is disabled on tamper
If you are using activation
To recover from a tamper
4.Use the following command to display the last tamper event:
lunash:> hsm tamper show
NOTE hsm tamper show only shows the last tamper event, even if several tampers have occurred. To view a complete list of the tamper events that have occurred on the HSM, use lunash:> hsm supportInfo.
5.Resolve the issue(s) that caused the tamper event.
6.If Policy 48: Do Controlled Tamper Recovery is enabled, clear the tamper condition. Otherwise, go to the next step:
lunash:> hsm tamper clear
7.If the tamper message indicates that a reset is required, reboot the HSM:
lunash:> hsm restart
8.Verify that all tampers have been cleared:
lunash:> hsm tamper show
9.If the HSM was decommissioned as a result of the tamper, you must re-create your partitions, re-initialize the partition roles (Partition SO, Crypto Officer, and Crypto User, and Audit as relevant), and restore the partition contents from backup. Refer to the following procedures:
a.To re-create your partitions, see Creating or Deleting an Application Partition.
b.Re-initialize the partition roles. See Initializing an Application Partition.
c.To restore the partition contents from backup, see Partition Backup and Restore.
10.If the Policy 22: Allow Activation and/or Policy 23: Allow AutoActivation are enabled on your multifactor quorum-authenticated partitions, the CO and CU (if enabled) must log in to reactivate those roles:
lunacm:> role login -name <role>
Security Effects of Administrative Actions
Actions that you take, in the course of administering your Luna HSM, can have effects, including destruction, on the roles, the spaces, and the contents of your HSM and its application partition(s). It is important to be aware of such consequences before taking action.
Overt Security Actions
Some actions in the administration of the HSM, or of an application partition, are explicitly intended to adjust specific security aspects of the HSM or partition. Examples are:
>Changing a password
>Modifying a policy to make a password or other attribute more stringent than the original setting
Those are discussed in their own sections.
Actions with Security- and Content-Affecting Outcomes
Other administrative events have security repercussions as included effects of the primary action, which could have other intent. Some examples are:
>HSM factory reset
>HSM zeroization
>Change of a destructive policy
>HSM initialization
>HSM firmware rollback
>Application partition initialization
This table lists some major administrative actions that can be performed on the HSM, and compares relevant security-related effects. Use the information in this table to help decide if your contemplated action is appropriate in current circumstances, or if additional preparation (such as backup of partition content, collection of audit data) would be prudent before continuing.
Factory Reset HSM
| Domain | Destroyed |
| HSM SO Role | Destroyed |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Destroyed |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | HSM/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Reset |
| RPV | Destroyed |
|
Messaging |
You are about to factory reset the HSM. All contents of the HSM will be destroyed. HSM policies will be reset and the remote PED vector will be erased. |
Zeroize HSM
| Domain | Destroyed |
| HSM SO Role | Destroyed |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Unchanged |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | HSM/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Unchanged |
| RPV | Unchanged |
|
Messaging |
You are about to zeroize the HSM. All contents of the HSM will be destroyed. HSM policies, remote PED vector and Auditor left unchanged. |
Change Destructive HSM Policy
| Domain | Unchanged |
| HSM SO Role | Unchanged |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Unchanged |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | HSM/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Unchanged except for new policy |
| RPV | Unchanged |
|
Messaging |
You are about to change a destructive HSM policy. All partitions of the HSM will be destroyed. |
HSM Initialize When Zeroized (hard init)
| Domain | Destroyed |
| HSM SO Role | Destroyed |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Unchanged |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | HSM/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Unchanged |
| RPV | Unchanged |
|
Messaging |
You are about to initialize the HSM. All contents of the HSM will be destroyed. |
HSM Initialize From Non-Zeroized State (soft init)
| Domain | Unchanged |
| HSM SO Role | Unchanged |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Unchanged |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | HSM/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Unchanged |
| RPV | Unchanged |
|
Messaging |
You are about to initialize the HSM that is already initialized. All partitions of the HSM will be destroyed. You are required to provide the current SO password. |
HSM Firmware Rollback
| Domain | Destroyed |
| HSM SO Role | Destroyed |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Destroyed |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | HSM/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Unchanged |
| RPV | Unchanged |
|
Messaging |
WARNING: This operation will rollback your HSM to the previous firmware version !!! (1) This is a destructive operation. (2) You will lose all your partitions. (3) You may lose some capabilities. (4) You must re-initialize the HSM. (5) If the PED use is remote, you must re-connect it. |
Partition Initialize When Zeroized (hard init)
| Domain | Unchanged |
| HSM SO Role | Unchanged |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Unchanged |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | Partition/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Unchanged |
| RPV | Unchanged |
|
Messaging |
You are about to initialize the partition. All contents of the partition will be destroyed. |
Partition Initialize From Non-Zeroized State (soft init)
| Domain | Unchanged |
| HSM SO Role | Unchanged |
| Partition SO Role | Destroyed |
| Auditor Role | Unchanged |
| Partition Roles | Destroyed |
| HSM or Partition/Contents | Partition/Destroyed |
| HSM Policies | Unchanged |
| RPV | Unchanged |
|
Messaging |
You are about to initialize the partition that is already initialized. All contents of the partition will be destroyed. You are required to provide the current Partition SO password. |
Elsewhere
Certain other actions can sometimes cause collateral changes to the HSM, like firmware update. They usually do not affect contents, unless a partition is full and the action changes the size of partitions or changes the amount of space-per-partition that is taken by overhead/infrastructure. These are discussed elsewhere.
