

THALES

# Thales Luna Network HSM 7

## PRODUCT OVERVIEW



# Document Information

---

<b>Last Updated</b>	2023-05-25 23:49:07 GMT-04:00
---------------------	-------------------------------

## **Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software**

Copyright 2001-2023 Thales Group. All rights reserved. Thales and the Thales logo are trademarks and service marks of Thales and/or its subsidiaries and are registered in certain countries. All other trademarks and service marks, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the property of their respective owners.

## **Disclaimer**

All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned solely by Thales Group and/or its subsidiaries who shall have and keep the sole right to file patent applications or any other kind of intellectual property protection in connection with such information.

Nothing herein shall be construed as implying or granting to you any rights, by license, grant or otherwise, under any intellectual and/or industrial property rights of or concerning any of Thales Group's information.

This document can be used for informational, non-commercial, internal, and personal use only provided that:

- > The copyright notice, the confidentiality and proprietary legend and this full warning notice appear in all copies.
- > This document shall not be posted on any publicly accessible network computer or broadcast in any media, and no modification of any part of this document shall be made.

Use for any other purpose is expressly prohibited and may result in severe civil and criminal liabilities.

The information contained in this document is provided "AS IS" without any warranty of any kind. Unless otherwise expressly agreed in writing, Thales Group makes no warranty as to the value or accuracy of information contained herein.

The document could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Furthermore, Thales Group reserves the right to make any change or improvement in the specifications data, information, and the like described herein, at any time.

Thales Group hereby disclaims all warranties and conditions with regard to the information contained herein, including all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Thales Group be liable, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, for any indirect, special or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever including but not limited to damages resulting from loss of use, data, profits, revenues, or customers, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information contained in this document.

Thales Group does not and shall not warrant that this product will be resistant to all possible attacks and shall not incur, and disclaims, any liability in this respect. Even if each product is compliant with current security standards in force on the date of their design, security mechanisms' resistance necessarily evolves according to the state of the art in security and notably under the emergence of new attacks. Under no circumstances, shall Thales Group be held liable for any third party actions and in particular in case of any successful attack against systems or equipment incorporating Thales products. Thales Group disclaims any liability with respect to security for direct, indirect, incidental or consequential damages that result from any use of its products. It is further stressed

that independent testing and verification by the person using the product is particularly encouraged, especially in any application in which defective, incorrect or insecure functioning could result in damage to persons or property, denial of service, or loss of privacy.

All intellectual property is protected by copyright. All trademarks and product names used or referred to are the copyright of their respective owners. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, chemical, photocopy, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of Thales Group.

## **Regulatory Compliance**

This product complies with the following regulatory regulations. To ensure compliancy, ensure that you install the products as specified in the installation instructions and use only Thales-supplied or approved accessories.

### **USA, FCC**

This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a “Class B” digital device, pursuant to part 15 of the FCC rules.

### **Canada**

This class B digital apparatus meets all requirements of the Canadian interference-causing equipment regulations.

### **Europe**

This product is in conformity with the protection requirements of EC Council Directive 2014/30/EU. This product satisfies the CLASS B limits of EN55032.

# CONTENTS

Preface: About the Product Overview .....	6
Customer Release Notes .....	6
Audience .....	6
Document Conventions .....	7
Support Contacts .....	9
<b>Chapter 1: Luna Hardware Security Modules .....</b>	<b>10</b>
Luna Network HSM .....	10
Ethernet-attached .....	10
Integrated Cryptographic Engine .....	11
Partitions .....	11
Dedicated Clients .....	11
Employ the HSM as a Service .....	11
Luna PCIe HSM .....	11
Single-partition .....	12
Cost Effective .....	12
Luna USB HSM 7 .....	12
Portable .....	12
Easy to Store and Use .....	12
Self-Contained .....	12
Single-partition .....	13
Cost Effective .....	13
Luna Backup HSM .....	13
Comparing the Luna HSM Variants .....	13
Luna HSM Models .....	14
Luna A (password-authenticated, FIPS Level 3) Models .....	14
Luna S (multifactor quorum-authenticated, FIPS Level 3) Models .....	14
Backup HSM Models .....	15
Luna HSM Features .....	15
<b>Chapter 2: Security .....</b>	<b>17</b>
Layered Encryption .....	17
Hierarchy of Protection .....	17
Three-Layer Authentication Model .....	17
Cloning Domain or Security Domain .....	17
Scalable Key Storage .....	18
Tamper Protection .....	19
Physical Security .....	19
Surrounding Environment .....	20
Authentication Data Security .....	20
Certification .....	21

---

FIPS .....	21
Common Criteria .....	21
eIDAS .....	21
QSCD .....	22
Handling and best practices .....	22
Common Criteria/eIDAS Compliance .....	22
<b>Chapter 3: Redundancy and Reliability .....</b>	<b>25</b>
High-Availability Groups .....	25
Clusters .....	28
Customized Load-Balancing .....	28
<b>Chapter 4: Networking .....</b>	<b>29</b>
Network Interfaces .....	29
NTLS and STC .....	30
<b>Chapter 5: Authentication .....</b>	<b>33</b>
Password Authentication .....	33
Advantages .....	34
Disadvantages .....	34
Multifactor Quorum Authentication .....	34
Remote Luna PED .....	35
Partition Activation and Challenge Secrets .....	35
Advantages .....	36
Disadvantages .....	36
<b>Chapter 6: Appliance Administration .....</b>	<b>37</b>
Appliance Management .....	37
Physical Maintenance .....	37
Appliance Roles and Users .....	37
Appliance Authentication .....	38
<b>Chapter 7: User Access Control .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Chapter 8: Capabilities and Policies .....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Chapter 9: Flexible Backups .....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Chapter 10: Logging and Reporting .....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Chapter 11: Functionality Modules .....</b>	<b>49</b>

# PREFACE: About the Product Overview

This document provides an overview of the Luna HSM suite of products. It contains the following chapters:

- > ["Luna Hardware Security Modules" on page 10](#)
- > ["Security" on page 17](#)
- > ["Redundancy and Reliability" on page 25](#)
- > ["Networking" on page 29](#)
- > ["Authentication" on page 33](#)
- > ["Appliance Administration" on page 37](#)
- > ["User Access Control" on page 39](#)
- > ["Capabilities and Policies" on page 42](#)
- > ["Flexible Backups" on page 44](#)
- > ["Logging and Reporting" on page 47](#)
- > ["Functionality Modules" on page 49](#)

The preface includes the following information about this document:

- > ["Customer Release Notes" below](#)
- > ["Audience" below](#)
- > ["Document Conventions" on the next page](#)
- > ["Support Contacts" on page 9](#)

For information regarding the document status and revision history, see ["Document Information" on page 2](#).

## Customer Release Notes

---

The Customer Release Notes (CRN) provide important information about specific releases. Read the CRN to fully understand the capabilities, limitations, and known issues for each release. You can view the latest version of the CRN at [www.thalesdocs.com](http://www.thalesdocs.com).

## Audience

---

This document is intended for personnel responsible for maintaining your organization's security infrastructure. This includes Luna HSM users and security officers, key manager administrators, and network administrators. All products manufactured and distributed by Thales are designed to be installed, operated, and maintained by personnel who have the knowledge, training, and qualifications required to safely perform the tasks assigned to them. The information, processes, and procedures contained in this document are intended for use by trained and qualified personnel only.

It is assumed that the users of this document are proficient with security concepts.

## Document Conventions

This document uses standard conventions for describing the user interface and for alerting you to important information.

### Notes

Notes are used to alert you to important or helpful information. They use the following format:

**NOTE** Take note. Contains important or helpful information.

### Cautions

Cautions are used to alert you to important information that may help prevent unexpected results or data loss. They use the following format:

**CAUTION!** Exercise caution. Contains important information that may help prevent unexpected results or data loss.

### Warnings

Warnings are used to alert you to the potential for catastrophic data loss or personal injury. They use the following format:

**\*\*WARNING\*\*** Be extremely careful and obey all safety and security measures. In this situation you might do something that could result in catastrophic data loss or personal injury.

## Command syntax and typeface conventions

Format	Convention
<b>bold</b>	<p>The bold attribute is used to indicate the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Command-line commands and options (Type <b>dir /p</b>.)</li> <li>&gt; Button names (Click <b>Save As</b>.)</li> <li>&gt; Check box and radio button names (Select the <b>Print Duplex</b> check box.)</li> <li>&gt; Dialog box titles (On the <b>Protect Document</b> dialog box, click <b>Yes</b>.)</li> <li>&gt; Field names (<b>User Name</b>: Enter the name of the user.)</li> <li>&gt; Menu names (On the <b>File</b> menu, click <b>Save</b>.) (Click <b>Menu</b> &gt; <b>Go To</b> &gt; <b>Folders</b>.)</li> <li>&gt; User input (In the <b>Date</b> box, type <b>April 1</b>.)</li> </ul>

Format	Convention
<i>italics</i>	In type, the italic attribute is used for emphasis or to indicate a related document. (See the <i>Installation Guide</i> for more information.)
<variable>	In command descriptions, angle brackets represent variables. You must substitute a value for command line arguments that are enclosed in angle brackets.
[optional] [<optional>]	Represent optional <b>keywords</b> or <variables> in a command line description. Optionally enter the keyword or <variable> that is enclosed in square brackets, if it is necessary or desirable to complete the task.
{a b c} {<a> <b> <c>}	Represent required alternate <b>keywords</b> or <variables> in a command line description. You must choose one command line argument enclosed within the braces. Choices are separated by vertical (OR) bars.
[a b c] [<a> <b> <c>]	Represent optional alternate keywords or variables in a command line description. Choose one command line argument enclosed within the braces, if desired. Choices are separated by vertical (OR) bars.



## Support Contacts

---

If you encounter a problem while installing, registering, or operating this product, please refer to the documentation before contacting support. If you cannot resolve the issue, contact your supplier or [Thales Customer Support](#). Thales Customer Support operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Your level of access is governed by the support plan negotiated between Thales and your organization. Please consult this plan for details regarding your entitlements, including the hours when telephone support is available to you.

### Customer Support Portal

The Customer Support Portal, at <https://supportportal.thalesgroup.com>, is where you can find solutions for most common problems and create and manage support cases. It offers a comprehensive, fully searchable database of support resources, including software and firmware downloads, release notes listing known problems and workarounds, a knowledge base, FAQs, product documentation, technical notes, and more.

**NOTE** You require an account to access the Customer Support Portal. To create a new account, go to the portal and click on the **REGISTER** link.

### Telephone

The support portal also lists telephone numbers for voice contact ([Contact Us](#)).

# CHAPTER 1: Luna Hardware Security Modules

Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are dedicated systems that physically and logically secure cryptographic keys and cryptographic processing. The purpose of an HSM is to protect sensitive data from being stolen by providing a highly secure operation structure. HSMs are fully contained and complete solutions for cryptographic processing, key generation, and key storage. They are purpose-built appliances that automatically include the hardware and firmware (i.e., software) necessary for these functions in an integrated package.

An HSM manages cryptographic keys used to lock and unlock access to digitized information over their life-cycle. This includes generation, distribution, rotation, storage, termination, and archival functions. An HSM also engages in cryptographic processing, which produces the dual benefits of isolation and offloading cryptographic processing from application servers.

HSMs are available in the following forms:

- > Standalone network-attached appliances, as described in ["Luna Network HSM" below](#).
- > Hardware cards that plug into existing network-attached systems, as described in ["Luna PCIe HSM" on the next page](#).
- > Portable USB-connected HSMs that connect to a client system, as described in ["Luna USB HSM 7" on page 12](#).
- > USB-connected backup HSMs, as described in ["Luna Backup HSM" on page 13](#).

For a comparison of the Luna HSM variants, and descriptions of the available models:

- > ["Comparing the Luna HSM Variants" on page 13](#)
- > ["Luna HSM Models" on page 14](#)

For a high-level overview of the distinctive features of the Luna HSM, see ["Luna HSM Features" on page 15](#).

## Luna Network HSM

---

Luna Network HSM stores, protects, and manages sensitive cryptographic keys in a centralized, high-assurance appliance, providing a root of trust for sensitive cryptographic data transactions. Deployed in more public cloud environments than any other HSM, Luna Network HSM works seamlessly across your on-premises, private, public, hybrid, and multi-cloud environments. Luna Network HSM is the most trusted general purpose HSM on the market, and with market leading performance, true hardware-based security, and the broadest ecosystem available, Luna Network HSM is at the forefront of HSM innovation.

### Ethernet-attached

An Ethernet-attached HSM, Luna Network HSM is designed to protect critical cryptographic keys and accelerate sensitive cryptographic operations across a wide range of security applications. It includes many features that increase security connectivity and ease-of-administration in dedicated and shared security applications.

## Integrated Cryptographic Engine

The Luna Network HSM can be shared between multiple applications or clients connected to it through a network. In the same way that mail and web servers provide email or web pages to authenticated clients, the Luna Network HSM offers powerful key management and high-performance cryptographic processing to clients on the network. To achieve this, the Luna Network HSM includes an integrated FIPS 140-2- validated HSM and the Cryptographic Engine, which offers the same high level of security as traditional HSMs. Additionally, the Luna Network HSM adds a secure service layer that allows the Cryptographic Engine to be shared between network clients.

## Partitions

The Luna Network HSM allows its single physical HSM to be divided into logical HSM partitions, each with independent data, access controls, and administrative policies. HSM partitions can be thought of as 'safety deposit boxes' that reside within the Cryptographic Engine's 'vault'. The vault itself offers an extremely high level of security for all the contents inside, while the safety deposit boxes protect their specific contents from people who have access to the vault. HSM partitions allow separate data storage and administration policies to be maintained by multiple applications sharing one HSM without fear of compromise from other partitions residing on it. Each HSM partition has a special access control role who manages it. Depending on the model, a Luna Network HSM can contain up to 100 partitions.

## Dedicated Clients

HSM partitions can be dedicated to a single Client, or multiple Clients that share access to a single HSM partition. Clients are applications, or application servers, that connect to the Luna Network HSM. Examples of possible clients are an encrypted database, a secure web server, or a Certificate Authority (CA); all these applications require the storage of sensitive cryptographic data or can benefit from the increased security and cryptographic performance offered by the Luna Network HSM. Each Client is assigned to one or more specific HSM partitions. Clients authenticate to the Luna Network HSM with a digital certificate and unique HSM partition challenge.

## Employ the HSM as a Service

Luna Network HSM empowers organizations to take a best practices approach to cryptographic key security by offloading cryptographic processes to a centralized, high-assurance key vault that can be deployed as a service. Only the Luna Network HSM is able to provide trusted key ownership and control, with full multi-tenancy across on-premises, private, public, hybrid, and multi-cloud environments.

## Luna PCIe HSM

---

Luna PCIe HSM stores, protects, and manages sensitive cryptographic keys in a small form factor PCIe card, providing a root of trust for sensitive cryptographic data transactions. With Luna PCIe HSM cryptographic processes are offloaded to a high-performance cryptographic processor. Luna PCIe HSM easily embeds in servers and security appliances for an easy-to-integrate and cost-efficient solution for FIPS 140-2 validated key security. Luna PCIe HSM benefits from a diverse feature set that enables greater centralized control through secure remote management, transport, and backup.

## Single-partition

The Luna PCIe HSM is a single-partition HSM card that you can embed in a pre-existing network-attached system. Access to the partition is managed by a special access control role. The Luna PCIe HSM offers hardware accelerated ECC algorithms that can be used in the development of solutions for resource constrained environments (devices like smart phones, tablets, etc.), without the need to purchase additional licenses. ECC offers high key strength at a greatly reduced key length compared to RSA keys; higher security with fewer resources.

## Cost Effective

Like the other Luna HSMs, the Luna PCIe HSM securely stores cryptographic keys in its hardware; sensitive information never leaves the HSM protection. The Luna PCIe HSM provides PKCS#11-compliant cryptographic services for applications running on the server in a secure and tamper-proof hardware package. Leveraging a Luna PCIe HSM in your appliance or service represents a cost effective way to bring FIPS 140-2, Common Criteria, and eIDAS-validated solutions to market.

Luna PCIe HSM empowers organizations to take a best practices approach to cryptographic key security by offloading cryptographic processes to a dedicated small form factor cryptographic processor. Luna PCIe HSM is the highest performing embedded HSM on the market.

## Luna USB HSM 7

---

Luna USB HSM 7 stores, protects, and manages sensitive cryptographic keys in a small form factor handheld device, providing a root of trust for sensitive cryptographic data transactions. Luna USB HSM 7 connects directly to a client workstation to provide PKCS#11-compliant cryptographic services, and can be secured safely as an offline root of trust. Luna USB HSM 7 provides easy multifactor quorum authentication, using USB PED key connected directly to the HSM and its built-in touchscreen to authenticate critical roles.

## Portable

The Luna USB HSM 7's hand-held form factor and USB connectivity make it the most portable model of Luna HSM. This allows you to easily store your important keys and connect the device to any client to perform cryptographic operations.

## Easy to Store and Use

The Luna USB HSM 7 can be stored indefinitely, making it ideal to safely store an offline root of trust, and retrieve from storage only when that root of trust is required. Using the Luna USB HSM 7 is as simple as connecting it to a client with the correct Luna HSM Client components installed.

## Self-Contained

The Luna USB HSM 7 can be operated entirely from the Luna HSM Client computer. Its built-in touchscreen allows you to perform all multifactor quorum authentication and PED key management operations locally, with no need to connect a Luna PED.

## Single-partition

The Luna USB HSM 7 is a single-partition HSM. Access to the partition is managed by a special access control role. The Luna USB HSM 7 offers hardware accelerated RSA algorithms that can be used in the development of solutions for resource constrained environments (devices like smart phones, tablets, etc.), without the need to purchase additional licenses.

## Cost Effective

Like the other Luna HSMs, the Luna USB HSM 7 securely stores cryptographic keys in its hardware; sensitive information never leaves the HSM protection. The Luna USB HSM 7 provides PKCS#11-compliant cryptographic services for applications running on the client in a secure and tamper-proof hardware package. Leveraging a Luna USB HSM 7 in your appliance or service represents a cost effective way to bring FIPS 140-3-validated solutions to market.

## Luna Backup HSM

The Luna Backup HSM allows you to back up the objects in your Network, PCIe, or USB application partitions and store the object archive in a secure HSM. Luna Backup HSMs are able to store objects only. They do not provide the ability to access the objects to perform cryptographic operations. See "[Flexible Backups](#)" on page 44 for more information.

Two versions are available, as detailed in "[Backup HSM Models](#)" on page 15.

## Comparing the Luna HSM Variants

Luna Network HSM Appliance	Luna PCIe HSM	Luna USB HSM 7
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Field-upgradable to 100 partitions</li> <li>&gt; Includes hardened OS</li> <li>&gt; High security, stable networking, and environmental protection via built-in chassis</li> <li>&gt; Routine firmware and software updates</li> <li>&gt; Automatic system logging</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Limited to 1 partition</li> <li>&gt; Compatible with external OS: Windows, Linux</li> <li>&gt; Allows custom and flexible chassis intrusion security</li> <li>&gt; Routine firmware updates</li> <li>&gt; Light and low-cost</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Limited to 1 partition</li> <li>&gt; Compatible with external OS: Windows, Linux</li> <li>&gt; Portable, hand-held device with touchscreen PIN entry</li> <li>&gt; Routine firmware updates</li> </ul>

A database server using an HSM would require one HSM, while a secure website using SSL on the same network would require a second, separate HSM. As the number of secure applications requiring an HSM grows, so does the number of ordinary HSMs deployed. The Luna Network HSM bypasses this limitation by implementing multiple virtual HSMs, or HSM Partitions on a single HSM server. A Luna PCIe HSM is useful for cases that need limited, but highly secure, data protection. A Luna Network HSM and its appliance are useful for cases that require a more complex security infrastructure, like cloud computing.

## Luna HSM Models

Both the Luna Network HSM and the Luna PCIe HSM come in different models with different performance capabilities. Which one you choose to use will depend on your organization's security needs.

**NOTE** The FIPS levels below indicate the standard to which the product is designed. Always confirm the HSM certification status before deploying an HSM in a regulated environment.

### Luna A (password-authenticated, FIPS Level 3) Models

Luna A models offer secure storage of your cryptographic information in a controlled and easy-to-manage environment. Luna A models protect your proprietary information by using password authentication. Depending on your needs, Luna A models are available at several performance levels, as follows:

Model	Luna Network HSM	Luna PCIe HSM
<b>Luna A700</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Standard performance</li> <li>&gt; 2MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Password-based authentication</li> <li>&gt; 5 partitions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Standard performance</li> <li>&gt; 2MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Password-based authentication</li> </ul>
<b>Luna A750</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Enterprise-level performance</li> <li>&gt; 16MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Password-based authentication</li> <li>&gt; 5 partitions, upgradable to 20</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Enterprise-level performance</li> <li>&gt; 16MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Password-based authentication</li> </ul>
<b>Luna A790</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Maximum performance</li> <li>&gt; 32MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Password-based authentication</li> <li>&gt; 10 partitions, upgradable to 100</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Maximum performance</li> <li>&gt; 32MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Password-based authentication</li> </ul>

### Luna S (multifactor quorum-authenticated, FIPS Level 3) Models

Luna S models offer secure storage of your cryptographic information in a controlled and highly secure environment. Luna S models protect your proprietary information by using multifactor quorum (PED) authentication. Depending on your needs, Luna S models are available at several performance levels, as follows:

Model	Luna Network HSM	Luna PCIe HSM
<b>Luna S700</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Standard performance</li> <li>&gt; 2MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Multifactor Quorum authentication</li> <li>&gt; 5 partitions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Standard performance</li> <li>&gt; 2MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Multifactor Quorum authentication</li> </ul>

Model	Luna Network HSM	Luna PCIe HSM
<b>Luna S750</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Enterprise-level performance</li> <li>&gt; 16MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Multifactor Quorum authentication</li> <li>&gt; 5 partitions, upgradable to 20</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Enterprise-level performance</li> <li>&gt; 16MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Multifactor Quorum authentication</li> </ul>
<b>Luna S790</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Maximum performance</li> <li>&gt; 32MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Multifactor Quorum authentication</li> <li>&gt; 10 partitions, upgradable to 100</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Maximum performance</li> <li>&gt; 32MB memory</li> <li>&gt; Multifactor Quorum authentication</li> </ul>

## Backup HSM Models

Backup HSMs offer secure backups of your Luna HSM user partitions. They can be initialized in either multifactor quorum-authenticated or password-authenticated mode:

- > multifactor quorum-authenticated backup HSMs can back up multifactor quorum-authenticated partitions.
- > password-authenticated backup HSMs can back up password-authenticated partitions.

Two versions are available:

- > the Luna Backup HSM G5 desktop model
- > the Luna Backup HSM 7 is available in the following models. Each model allows you to back up up to 100 partitions. In-field storage upgrades are not available.

<b>B700</b>	32 MB storage, up to 100 partitions of the same authentication type
<b>B750</b>	128 MB storage, up to 100 partitions of the same authentication type
<b>B790</b>	256 MB storage, up to 100 partitions of the same authentication type

## Luna HSM Features

Luna HSMs have a variety of features that distinguish them, as summarized below:

<b>Security</b>	<p>Luna HSMs are designed and manufactured to high security standards, to comply with FIPS Level 3 and Common Criteria certifications, and updated validations are sought whenever major changes/improvements are introduced. Luna HSMs protect your data from unwanted tampering with secure anti-intrusion and vulnerability detection mechanisms.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Security" on page 17</a> for details.</p>
<b>Redundancy</b>	<p>Luna HSMs are equipped with physical features and configurations that enable auto-recovery of your HSMs.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Redundancy and Reliability" on page 25</a> for details.</p>



<b>Networking</b>	<p>Luna Network HSMs support secure NTLS and STC network connections for client applications. The Luna Network HSM appliance has multiple ports, allowing flexible network connections.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Networking" on page 29</a> for details.</p>
<b>Access control</b>	<p>Luna HSM products offer multiple identities, some mandatory and some optional, that you can invoke in different ways to map to roles and functions in your organization.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"User Access Control" on page 39</a> for details.</p>
<b>Authentication</b>	<p>Luna Network HSMs and Luna PCIe HSMs are factory-configured to be either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; password-authenticated (single-factor authentication)</li> <li>&gt; multifactor quorum-authenticated (physical PED key authentication with option for quorum authentication)</li> </ul> <p>The Luna USB HSM 7 can be initialized using either method, to be compatible with your existing Luna HSM deployment.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Authentication" on page 33</a> for details.</p>
<b>Administration</b>	<p>The Luna Network HSM appliance can be managed using several administrative interfaces.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Appliance Administration" on page 37</a> for details.</p>
<b>Capabilities and policies</b>	<p>Luna HSMs, and partitions within them, are characterized by capabilities that are set at the factory or added by means of capability updates, and that are adjusted by means of settable policies that correspond to some of them.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Capabilities and Policies" on page 42</a> for details.</p>
<b>Backups</b>	<p>Luna HSMs contain sensitive material that, if lost, could be detrimental. The Luna Backup HSM and Remote Backup Service securely back up and store such information that can be restored in case of failures in primary HSM functioning.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Flexible Backups" on page 44</a> for details.</p>
<b>Logging and reporting</b>	<p>Luna HSMs are equipped with performance monitoring and audit logging features to monitor security and provide audits of HSM activity.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Logging and Reporting" on page 47</a> for details.</p>
<b>Functionality Modules</b>	<p>Functionality Modules (FMs) consist of your own custom-developed code, loaded into and operating within the logical and physical security of a Luna Network HSM as part of the HSM firmware. FMs allow you to customize your Luna Network HSM's functionality to suit the needs of your organization.</p> <p>See <a href="#">"Functionality Modules" on page 49</a> for details.</p>



# CHAPTER 2: Security

Luna HSMs ensure the highest quality of protection of your cryptographic material with the following security measures:

- > ["Layered Encryption" below](#)
- > ["Tamper Protection" on page 19](#)
- > ["Certification" on page 21](#)

## Layered Encryption

---

Luna HSMs do not keep any objects unencrypted. All objects are encrypted by multiple layers, and are fully decrypted in temporary (volatile) memory only when needed.

### Hierarchy of Protection

One general storage key (GSK), for the HSM, protects general storage objects that might be needed by various roles. A separate user storage key (USK) for each role protects the contents of the partition accessed by that role. The hierarchy of protection applies to each individual role. The USK for each role on the HSM encrypts objects that are owned by that role, ensuring that each person sees and touches only what belongs to them. Every Luna HSM has a master tamper key (MTK) that strongly encrypts each object generated and stored within the HSM.

The key encryption key (KEK) further encrypts every key being used to ensure that your keys are never shown in plaintext.

### Three-Layer Authentication Model

The Luna Network HSM, and access to data stored on the Cryptographic Engine contained within it, is protected by a number of different means to provide in-depth security. The Luna Network HSM's three-layer authentication model includes separate HSM partition authentication, 2-way network authentication, and process-level application authentication to respectively control administrative, client, and application access. This three-layer model, coupled with multi-level user authentication policies, integrated FIPS 140-2 Level 3-validated Cryptographic Engine, and secure software and hardware design, allows the Luna Network HSM to offer a high degree of security and performance without sacrificing the flexibility of a network-attached device.

### Cloning Domain or Security Domain

Every HSM or partition is part of a security domain, set at initialization time. This is also called a cloning domain, because objects under such a domain can be securely copied (cloned) only to other HSMs or partitions that share that exact domain.

Multiple HSMs or partitions can be set to be part of the same cloning domain or different ones. Key material cannot leave its cloning domain, so if an attacker were to try to copy your cryptographic material to a device that does not share a cloning domain with your HSM or partition, they would be unsuccessful. Using cloning domains ensures that key material can travel only between trusted and authorized devices. This adds a strong layer of defense against attackers.

**NOTE** The security or cloning domain is not the lowest encryption level, so a cloning operation does not provide access to Crypto material.

Other than direct use of the partition clone command, operations that use cloning are limited to backup, restore and synchronizing the HSMs in HA groups ( among HSMs that share the same domain). Only the backup operation imposes a source-partition domain on the target partition within the Backup HSM; the restore operation and the HA synchronization both require that the source and target HSMs or partitions must already have matching domains.

## Scalable Key Storage

[Luna HSM Firmware 7.7.0](#) and newer supports Scalable Key Storage (SKS), the ability to securely store off-board many more keys than can fit within the bounds of the HSM card hardware. Partitions at [Luna HSM Firmware 7.7.0](#) and newer can be configured in one of the following ways by the HSM SO:

- > version zero (V0) partitions, the default, continue to use the cloning model described above (also referred to as "Keys in Hardware")
- > version one (V1) partitions use cloning only for the SKS Master Key (SMK), while all other backup/restore and HA operations involve keys and objects being exported and imported as encrypted binary large objects (blobs), while otherwise remaining securely encrypted in external storage (either in Luna Network HSM appliance storage or on a host computer for a Luna PCIe HSM or Luna USB HSM 7)

The SMK secures all stored keys and objects within the security envelope of the HSM, even when they reside in offboard storage because:

- > the keys and objects are securely encrypted with the SMK when not in use inside the HSM
- > the SMK is secured by the traditional "keys in hardware" cloning/security domain, and can be copied only to another HSM or partition that shares the specific cloning/security domain. The cloning (or security) domain is set by the Partition SO and does not change for the life of the partition.

On V1 partitions, HA replication and synchronization that traditionally used cloning transparently use a combination of SMK cloning and SKS extract/insert operations. An operation like a cloning command or backup/restore command invokes cloning of all indicated objects when used against a V0 partition or a pre-firmware-7.7.0 partition.

The same command, when used against a V1 partition, invokes cloning for the SMK, and then silently invokes SKS to complete the copying of indicated keys and objects, once the SMK is in place on the destination partition.

Either way, your keys and objects remain protected by the HSM's security envelope. Externally stored keys (in the form of encrypted blobs) cannot be decrypted or used until they are brought back inside the physical HSM.

---

# Tamper Protection

---

## Physical Security

Luna HSMs are equipped with intrusion-resistant, tamper-evident hardware, and use the strongest cryptographic algorithms to ensure that your data is secure. If a security breach is detected, a tamper event occurs and the HSM becomes locked until the tamper is cleared by the appropriate authority or the HSM is reset.

### Luna Network HSM

The Luna Network HSM appliance is a commercial-grade secure appliance. This means that:

- > It is provided with anti-tamper external features that make physical intrusion into the unit difficult. These measures deter casual intrusion and leave visible evidence of attempts (successful or otherwise) to open the unit.
- > Vents and other paths into the unit are baffled to prevent probing from the outside.
- > It includes a hardened OS that constantly monitors for security vulnerabilities.
- > The HSM card inside the appliance houses the actual HSM components. It is encased in an aluminum shell, filled with hardened epoxy. Attempts to gain access to the circuit board itself would result in physical evidence of the attempted access and likely physical destruction of the circuitry and components, thus ensuring that your keys and sensitive objects are safe from an attacker.

### Luna PCIe HSM

The Luna PCIe HSM, or cryptographic module, is a multi-chip standalone module as defined by FIPS PUB 140-2 section 4.5. This means that:

- > The module is enclosed in a strong enclosure that provides tamper-evidence. Any tampering that might compromise the module's security is detectable by visual inspection of the physical integrity of the module. In addition, any attempts to physically tamper with the token would likely result in the destruction of its circuitry and components, thus ensuring that your keys and sensitive objects are safe from an attacker.
- > The module's physical design also resists visual inspection of the device design, physical probing of the device and attempts to access sensitive data on individual components of the device.

If an attacker with unlimited resources were to simply steal the module, and apply the resources of a well-equipped engineering lab, it might be possible to breach the physical security. However, without the password (password-authenticated HSMs) or the PED keys (multifactor quorum-authenticated HSMs), such an attacker would be unable to decipher any signal or data that they manage to extract.

With that said, it is your responsibility to ensure the physical security of the unit to prevent such theft, and it is your responsibility to enforce procedural security to prevent an attacker ever having possession of (or unsupervised access to) both the HSM and its authentication secrets.

### Luna USB HSM 7

The Luna USB HSM 7 is a multi-chip standalone module as defined by FIPS PUB 140-2 section 4.5, like the Luna PCIe HSM described above, and provides the same physical tamper resistance measures. The Luna USB HSM 7 contains HSM hardware in a sealed, tamper-resistant enclosure, and all keys are stored encrypted within the hardware, inaccessible without the proper credentials (password or PED key).

## Surrounding Environment

The data sheets provided for individual products show the environmental limits that the device is designed to withstand. It is your responsibility to ensure that the unit is protected throughout its working lifetime from extremes of temperature, humidity, dust, vibration/shock that exceed the stated limits.

We do not normally specify operational tolerances for vibration and shock, as the Luna HSM is intended for installation and use in an office or data center environment. We perform qualification testing on all our products to ensure that they will survive extremes encountered in shipping, which we assume to be more demanding than the intended operational environment.

It is also your responsibility to ensure that the HSM is installed in a secure location, safe from vandalism, theft, and other attacks. In summary, this usually means a clean, temperature-, humidity-, and access-controlled facility. We also strongly recommend power conditioning and surge suppression to prevent electrical damage, much as you would do for any important electronic equipment.

## Authentication Data Security

All of the above security features are built into the HSM product, and they do present strong barriers to attackers. It is important that your own organization's security mandates, processes, and procedures avoid compromising that protection. It is all very well to have protection against external and opportunist attackers. But it is also necessary to ensure consistent proper handling by your own staff, over the long term.

Procedural checks and balances, with oversight, are important.

If you give one person access to all roles, domains, you have created a single point of failure, both in terms of access and reliability of your service and in terms of security. This is why our HSM products encourage separation of roles.

A network HSM appliance has the HSM encased within a tamper-resistant/tamper-evident host with a hardened operating system that further limits external access by confining entry paths to:

### > **administrative**

- via SSH and the constrained lunash command set
- via REST interface, again constrained by serving only specific, relevant API access

### > **application**

- via NTLS that serves application calls and responses to the HSM and returns results from the HSM to the connected application client
- via STC that tunnels all the way to the HSM, exposing no unencrypted traffic in the appliance

The appliance-level roles (admin, operator, monitor, audit, and any custom named roles you might create) give graduated access to appliance functions, but also to the threshold of the HSM. The HSM-level roles are separate and distinct. You can log into the appliance for network and other host-level configuration and maintenance operations as any of the appliance roles, without ever getting into the HSM. The HSM then requires separate login to any of its roles.

It is your responsibility to protect passwords and/or PED keys from disclosure or theft and to ensure that personnel who might need to input passwords do not allow themselves to be watched while doing so, and that they do not use a computer or terminal with keystroke logging software installed.

As a best practice, engage in role/responsibility separation as much as possible (the HSM interfaces encourage this), but if your model puts all administrative functions in the hands of one person, at least be aware of how much power that gives them over the content and the use and the availability of your important keys and objects, and have contingencies in place to address the possibility of that person ever becoming compromised in any way.

For example, when the HSM SO creates an application partition, the eventual owner of that partition should change passwords (including hardware authentication tokens, like iKeys for multifactor quorum) for themselves [partition SO] and others [User or Crypto Officer, Limited Crypto officer, Crypto User] as applicable. The HSM SO can still delete the partition, but has no visibility or entry into it.

Password authentication for roles and cloning/security domains are only as secure as any text string can be made secure.

Multifactor Quorum authentication for roles and cloning/security domains are generally much more secure (and used to protect the highest value keys and objects), because you can exert procedural control over the physical portion of the authentication secrets, such as lockups, sign-outs/sign-ins, audits, etc.

## Certification

---

The Thales website provides more information about the certifications, compliance, and validation progress for each of the Luna HSM variants:

<https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/encryption/hardware-security-modules/general-purpose-hsms>

### FIPS

At any given time, a FIPS-validated version of the HSM firmware is available, and a newer, not-yet-validated version might also be available for newly introduced products that have not had time to go through the long evaluation and validation process. The usual practice is to ship units pre-loaded with the firmware and software at the FIPS-validated level by default, while providing the option to update the Client software, Appliance software, and HSM firmware to the newer version. This allows customers who need FIPS validation to have that configuration from the factory, and customers who need newer features (and do not need FIPS validation) to upgrade by simply installing the newer software and following the upgrade procedure.

### Common Criteria

Some versions of the product are submitted for Common Criteria EAL evaluation.

You can check with Thales Customer Support to inquire about the certification status of Luna HSM products. If FIPS validation or CC EAL certification are not requirements for you, then the newest version is normally the preferred option.

### eIDAS

eIDAS (**e**lectronic **I**dentification, **A**uthentication and trust **S**ervices) is the standard for electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the European Union. Luna Network HSMs and Luna PCIe HSMs achieved this certification in October of 2020.

## QSCD

While the Luna PCIe HSM has achieved certification to act as a Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device in its own right, or while embedded within Luna Network HSM, its actual use in that capacity is dependent upon the region in which it is deployed and the SCA or other application or framework with which it is integrated. Consult your Thales representative for the most current information and advice relative to your needs.

## Handling and best practices

All of the above security features are built into the HSM product, and they do present strong barriers to attackers. It is up to you to avoid practices that devalue or circumvent the security features.

## Common Criteria/eIDAS Compliance

Luna HSMs regularly qualify against relevant standards that are important in the information security, data protection, and transaction protection spaces, and for which a business case supports the resource expenditure. Validation is repeated/updated when product changes warrant doing so, according to the respective standards and the requirements of the qualified testing laboratories.. HSM validations are reacquired when major new versions of applicable standards are released, and are also kept up with minor submissions and adjustments when a standard is tweaked or when interpretations shift on the part of testing/validation laboratories.

Under Common Criteria, Thales has looked to qualify our Luna HSM products against eIDAS standards relevant to general purpose hardware security modules.

Luna HSMs are eIDAS certified as Qualified Signature Creation Devices and Qualified Seal Creation Devices (QSCD), and are used by Qualified Trust Service Providers (QTSP) in the role of their root of trust.

See <https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/compliance/eidas> and <https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/compliance/americas/fips-140-2>

CC takes the view that a solution is validated for a purpose, which generally means that a number of moving parts are considered in concert. Thus an HSM is evaluated as an element of an overall solution that also includes software products, procedures, and systems all interacting. The following documents provide expanded detail on the relevant topics.

[DOW0006186 \(KB0023049\)](#) is "Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module COMMON CRITERIA USER GUIDANCE - PART 1: PREPARATIVE PROCEDURES"

[DOW0006187 \(KB0023050\)](#) is "Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module COMMON CRITERIA USER GUIDANCE - PART 2: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE"

[DOW0006188 \(KB0023051\)](#) is "Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module COMMON CRITERIA USER GUIDANCE - PART 3: EIDAS GUIDANCE"

[DOW0006189 \(KB0023052\)](#) is "Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module COMMON CRITERIA USER GUIDANCE - PART 4 TOE INTEGRATION FOR USE IN COMPOSITE EVALUATION"

The K7 module referred to, in those document titles,

- > is the heart of the Luna Network HSM ([Luna Network HSM appliance](#)) and
- > is also available in a separate PCIe card format for insertion in a host system ([Luna PCIe HSM](#)).



Roles	Principal Duties
HSM Security Officer (HSM SO)  [Admin Partition Role]	The HSM SO is responsible for managing the HSM. As such, he/she is authorized to install and configure the HSM, set and maintain global HSM security policies. He/she is also able to request the load of new HSM firmware update files (FUF), new Configuration Update Files (CUF) and new Functional Modules (FM). The HSM SO is able to create and delete partitions, but is not authorized to generate, load or use keys stored on the user partitions that have been created. The HSM SO is able to create, manage and use keys created in the Admin Partition alongside is responsible for initializing the 'Administrator role'. The HSM SO can reset the Administrator password (configuration dependent). The HSM can have only one HSM SO.
[Admin Partition Role]	The Administrator is authorized to create, use, transfer and destroy key objects contained in the Admin partition. This role has privileges that are a subset of the HSM SO role.
Partition Security Officer (Partition SO)  [User Partition Role]	The Partition SO creates the partition level Partition CO role, activates partition, sets and changes partition-level policies, with an option to reset the Partition CO password (configuration dependent).
Partition Crypto Officer (Partition CO)  [User Partition Role]	The Partition CO role is authorized to create, use, destroy and transfer key objects for a given partition. The Partition CO can optionally create the Partition LCO and Partition CU, and perform initial assignment of key authorization data.
Partition Limited Crypto Officer (Partition LCO)  [User Partition Role]	The Partition LCO is an optional partition role authorized to create and use key objects, and perform initial assignment of key authorization data. The role is only permitted to delete key objects where per-key authorization is used and the correct authorization data for a given key object can be presented to the cryptographic module.
Partition Crypto User (Partition CU)  [User Partition Role]	The Partition CU is the partition role authorized to use the key objects within the partition (e.g. sign, encrypt/decrypt).
Audit User [Admin Partition Role]	The Audit User initializes the secret key used to generate Message Authentication Code (MAC) for secure audit messages alongside configuring logging levels for the HSM.

Roles	Principal Duties
Key Owner [Admin or User Partition Role]	Implicit role used to authenticate the owner of a key through verification of the related key authorization data.
STC User [Admin or User Partition Role]	The STC user is optional role used with a remote Thales Luna client to initiate a secure tunnel with a target partition. Once successfully authenticated based on pre-registered authentication credentials, the STC user is able to submit commands to the target partition over a trusted channel.



# CHAPTER 3: Redundancy and Reliability

Luna HSMs have two available configuration models for redundancy and reliability:

- > ["High-Availability Groups" below](#)
- > ["Clusters" on page 28](#)

## High-Availability Groups

---

Luna HSMs can provide scalability and redundancy for cryptographic applications that are critical to your organization. For applications that require continuous, uninterrupted uptime, the Luna HSM Client allows you to combine application partitions on multiple HSMs into a single logical group, known as a High-Availability (HA) group.

An HA group allows your client application to access cryptographic services as long as one member HSM is functional and network-connected. This allows you to perform maintenance on any individual member without ever pausing your application, and provides redundancy in the case of individual failures. Cryptographic requests are distributed across all active group members, enabling a performance gain for each member added. Cryptographic objects are replicated across the entire group, so HA can also be used to keep a current, automatic, remote backup of the group contents.

HA functionality is handled by the Luna HSM Client software. The individual partitions have no way to know they are configured in an HA group, so you can configure HA on a per-application basis. The way you group your HSMs depends on your circumstances and desired performance.

### Performance

For repetitive operations (for example, many signings using the same key), an HA group provides linear performance gains as group members are added. The best approach is to maintain an HA group at a size that best balances application server capability and the expected loads, with an additional unit providing capacity for bursts of traffic.

### Load Balancing

Cryptographic requests sent to the HA group's virtual slot are load-balanced across all active members of the HA group. The load-balancing algorithm sends requests for cryptographic operations to the least busy partition in the HA group. This scheme accounts for operations of variable length, ensuring that queues are balanced even when some partitions are assigned very long operations. When an application requests a repeated set of operations, this method works. When the pattern is interrupted, however, the request type becomes relevant, as follows:

- > Single-part (stateless) cryptographic operations are load-balanced.
- > Multi-part (stateful) cryptographic operations are load-balanced.

- > Multi-part (stateful) information retrieval requests are not load-balanced. In this case, the cost of distributing the requests to different HA group members is generally greater than the benefit. For this reason, multi-part information retrieval requests are all targeted at one member.
- > Key management requests are not load-balanced. Operations affecting the state of stored keys (creation, deletion) are performed on a single HA member, and the result is then replicated to the rest of the HA group.

## Key Replication

Objects (session or token) are replicated immediately to all members in an HA group when they are generated in the virtual HA slot. Similarly, deletion of objects (session or token) from the virtual HA slot is immediately replicated across all group members. Therefore, when an application creates a key on the virtual HA slot, the HA library automatically replicates the key across all group members before reporting back to the application. Keys are created on one member partition and replicated to the other members. If a member fails during this process, the HA group reattempts key replication to that member until it recovers, or failover attempts time out. Once the key exists on all active members of the HA group, a success code is returned to the application.

**NOTE** If you are using [Luna HSM Client 10.4.0](#) or newer and are setting up an HA group with a mix of FIPS and non-FIPS partitions as members, objects will not replicate across all HSMs in the group in the following cases:

- > If you have set a non-FIPS primary, a FIPS secondary, and created a non-FIPS approved key on the group, the key will not replicate to the FIPS secondary. No error is returned when this occurs.
- > If you synchronize group members with the [hagroup synchronize](#) LunaCM command, any non-FIPS keys will fail to replicate to the FIPS member(s). An error is returned when this occurs, but lunaCM synchronizes everything else.

**NOTE** If your application bypasses the virtual slot and creates or deletes directly in a physical member slot, the action occurs only in that single physical slot, and can be overturned by the next synchronization operation. For this reason we generally advise to enable HA-only, unless you have specific reason to access individual physical slots, and are prepared (in your application) to perform the necessary housekeeping.

**Key replication, for pre-firmware-7.7.0 HSM partitions and for V0 partitions**, uses the Luna cloning protocol, which provides mutual authentication, confidentiality, and integrity for each object that is copied from one partition to another. Therefore, *prior to [Luna HSM Firmware 7.8.0](#)*, all HA group member partitions must be initialized with the same cloning domain.

**Key replication, for [Luna HSM Firmware 7.8.0](#) (and newer) HSM partitions and for V0 partitions**, and [Luna HSM Client 10.5.0](#) (and newer), becomes more versatile with Extended Domain Management, as each member partition can have as many as three cloning/security domains. It becomes possible to easily mix password-authenticated and multi-factor (PED) authenticated partitions in HA groups. Any member must have at least one of its domains in common with the current primary member. [For reasons of redundancy and overlap, we recommend that you *not* create (say) a 4-member group where the primary has domains A, B, C, and the three secondary members include one member with domain A, one member with domain B, and one member with domain C, where no other domains belong to the group -- such a group could function only until the primary failed/went-offline, at which point the next primary would have no domain peers with which to synchronize. Therefore, consider redundancy overlap when using Extended Domain Management with HA group members.

**Key replication for V1 partitions** uses the Luna cloning protocol to ensure that all HA group members have the same SMK, and uses SKS to export a key originating at one member and to import and decrypt that key (using the common SMK) on each other member in the group. Again, all HA group member partitions must be initialized with the same cloning domain in order that the common SMK can be available on every member.

## Failover

When any active HA group member fails, a failover event occurs – the affected partition is dropped from the list of available HA group members, and all operations that were pending on the failed partition are transparently rescheduled on the remaining member partitions. The Luna HSM Client continuously monitors the health of member partitions at two levels:

- > network connectivity – disruption of the network connection causes a failover event after a 20-second timeout.
- > command completion – any command that is not executed within 20 seconds causes a failover event.

As long as one HA group member remains functional, cryptographic service is maintained to an application no matter how many other group members fail.

## Recovery

Recovery of a failed HA group member is designed to be automatic in as many cases as possible. You can configure your auto-recovery settings to require as much manual intervention as is convenient for you and your organization. In either an automated or manual recovery process, there is no need to restart your application. As part of the recovery process:

- > Any cryptographic objects created while the member was offline are automatically replicated to the recovered partition.
- > The recovered partition becomes available for its share of load-balanced cryptographic operations.

## Standby Members

After you add member partitions to an HA group, you can designate some as standby members. Cryptographic objects are replicated on all members of the HA group, including standby members, but standby members do not perform any cryptographic operations unless all the active members go offline. In this event, all standby members are immediately promoted to active service, and operations are load-balanced across them. This provides an extra layer of assurance against a service blackout for your application.

## Mixed-Version HA Groups

Generally, Thales recommends using HSMs with the same software/firmware in HA groups; different versions have different capabilities, and a mixed HA group is limited to those functions that are common to the versions involved. A mixed-version HA group may have access to fewer cryptographic mechanisms, or have different restrictions in FIPS mode. However, HA groups containing both Luna 6 and 7 partitions and Luna Cloud HSM services are supported. This mixed-version configuration is useful for migrating keys to a new Luna 7 HSM or the cloud, or to gradually upgrade your production environment from Luna 6 to Luna 7.

---

## Clusters

---

Luna Network HSM now allows you to store your cryptographic objects in an encrypted *cluster* within the appliance memory. This process uses [Scalable Key Storage \(SKS\)](#) to encrypt the cluster and the SMK is shared with all member HSMs. The cluster contains *keyrings*, which are analogous to application partitions and can be accessed by a client in much the same way, by connecting to any member appliance. Keys are retrieved from the cluster, decrypted within the secure confines of the HSM, and used by the HSM for cryptographic operations. This configuration allows you to store many more keys than you can normally store within HSM partitions. The management of backup and restore operations is greatly simplified; the HSM administrator can back up the full content of a cluster, at scheduled intervals or on demand.

A cluster can consist of one Luna Network HSM member appliance, or multiple appliances that share the contents of the cluster. Adding multiple members to a cluster improves performance, and provides redundancy and failover for your client applications. Thales recommends a maximum of 4 members per cluster.

Up to 3000 keyrings can be created on the cluster, and each keyring can contain up to 256 objects.

### Customized Load-Balancing

Luna Network HSMs within a cluster can be configured in one of two affinity groups (**local** and **remote**), meaning that operations from a connected client application are load-balanced between members of the same group only. This allows you to use the other members, which can be at a remote location with greater latency, as backup or standby members for a specific client. If all members of a client's preferred group are unavailable, operations then fail over to the other group. The state of keyrings and objects stored on them is always synchronized across all members of the cluster, regardless of group. When one or more members of the preferred group become available again, you must restart your client application to move operations back to the preferred group.

# CHAPTER 4: Networking

Luna Network HSMs support multiple different network configurations via:

- > ["Network Interfaces" below](#)
- > ["NTLS and STC" on the next page](#)

## Network Interfaces


The Luna Network HSM appliance enables flexible network configurations by way of multiple network interfaces that can be configured in various ways.

### Ethernet Ports

The Luna Network HSM appliance has four 1Gb/a Ethernet LAN ports and one RJ-45 serial port, used for initial network configuration.

The network device interfaces (eth0, eth1, eth2, and eth3) and serial port are located on the rear of the appliance, as illustrated in ["HSM Appliance Ports" below](#):

**Figure 1: HSM Appliance Ports**




Each Ethernet (Eth) port can be used to configure an individual network device, or the interfaces can be combined to enable a redundant network configuration. (See ["Network Interface Bonding" below](#).)

You use the serial port to connect a serial device to the Luna Network HSM for access to LunaSH to perform initial network configuration. You will need to use the serial port to configure at least one of the network interfaces. Once you have configured an interface, you can connect the appliance to the network and access LunaSH to complete the network configuration.

### Network Interface Bonding

Luna Network HSM has four physical network interface devices: eth0, eth1, eth2, and eth3. You can bond eth0 and eth1 into a single virtual interface, bond0, or eth2 and eth3 into bond1, to provide a redundant active/standby interface.

["Network Interface Bonding" on the next page](#) shows how individual devices (marked by eth) can be combined to create a bonded device.

**Figure 2: Network Interface Bonding**

Network traffic can be bound to a single device, or a bonded device. The primary purpose of the bonding service is a hot standby mode for network interface failure, ensuring a constant stable connection to your appliance.

Once bonding is configured, client connections as well as SSH connections continue uninterrupted if either or the bonded interfaces fails.

## NTLS and STC


Luna Network HSM supports network connections over two different types of channels:

- > NTL (Network Trust Link)
- > STC (Secure Trusted Channel)

### Network Trust Link Server

Network Trust Links (NTLs) are secure, authenticated network connections between the Luna Network HSM appliance and clients. NTLs use two-way digital certificate authentication and TLS data encryption to protect your sensitive data during all communications between HSM partitions on the appliance and its clients.

"[NTLS Connection](#)" below shows how an NTLS connection is made between the client and the appliance.

**Figure 3: NTLS Connection**

Certificates are created on both the appliance and the client. These certificates are exchanged to register the appliance and client with each other. Once registered, the appliance will recognize the client and allow it access to the HSM and partitions it wants. NTLS encrypts data between the network interfaces of the appliance (shown as eth0 in the diagram) and client, but not between the network interface and the HSM within the appliance.

The Luna Network HSM appliance can support up to 800 simultaneous NTLS connections.

## Secure Trusted Channel


Secure Trusted Channel (STC) uses secure key exchange and data encryption to protect your sensitive data during communications between HSM partitions and clients. The type of data encryption you use is up to you; STC is flexible and customizable.

STC supports a wide range of end-points, but its primary end-points are client applications connecting to the HSM to access its cryptographic services and/or to perform module management functions. STC provides three basic services:

- > Privacy of all communicated data through the use of symmetric encryption so only the end-points can read any sensitive data.
- > Integrity of the communicated data through the use of message authentication codes so that not eavesdropper could add, delete, modify or replay any command or response.
- > Mutual authentication of the HSM and the end-point so that only authorized entities can establish a STC connection and there can be no man-in-the-middle attack.

"STC Connection" below shows how an STC connection is made between the client and the appliance.

**Figure 4: STC Connection**



STC connects a client directly to a specific partition on the HSM in the appliance.

The STC connection consists of two phases: tunnel establishment and message handling. During tunnel establishment the end-parties perform bi-directional authentication and then establish unique session keys for each connection. After a connection is established between the network interfaces of the appliance (shown as eth0 in the diagram) and client, the message handling phase securely transmits commands to the HSM and receives HSM responses. Any attempt to alter, insert or drop messages is detected by both end-points and results in immediate termination of the connection.

NTLS must be set up before you use STC.

## Comparing NTLS and STC

NTLS	STC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>&gt; Consistent high performance</li><li>&gt; Not recommended for use with public networks</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>&gt; Exceptionally secure and safe to use with public networks</li><li>&gt; Customizable parameters</li><li>&gt; Performance depends on parameters set</li></ul>

For detailed instructions on setting up NTLS or STC, see [Client-Partition Connections](#).



# CHAPTER 5: Authentication

Each Luna HSM comes in one of two authentication types – password or multifactor quorum (also called PED-authenticated). PED stands for PIN Entry Device. The authentication type for Luna Network HSM and Luna PCIe HSM is configured at the factory and cannot be modified in the field. Luna USB HSM 7 can be initialized to use one or the other.

For an outline of the key differences between password and multifactor quorum authentication, see ["Authentication Types" below](#).

**Table 1: Authentication Types**

Password Authentication	Multifactor Quorum Authentication (PED keys/Luna PED)
Two-factor authentication is not available; relies on "something you know".	Two-factor authentication consisting of a physical PED key and optional PIN; that is, can require "something you know" in addition to "something you have" for authentication
Authentication can be input locally or from a remote terminal.	Authentication requires physical local connection or pre-configured Remote PED link.
Access to cryptographic keys is restricted to knowledge of partition CO (read/write) or CU (read-only) password.	Access to cryptographic keys is restricted to CO (read/write) and CU (read only); possession of appropriate PED key(s) and PIN is required.
Dual or multi-person access control is not available.	Dual or multi-person (quorum) access control is available by way of MofN (split-knowledge secret sharing); physical PED keys, each containing a portion of the role-authentication secret, can be held by separate people who must cooperate to perform authentication.
Key-custodian responsibility and role separation depend on password knowledge only.	Key-custodian responsibility and role separation depend on PED key(s) ownership; physical possession and PIN knowledge.

## Password Authentication

For Luna HSMs using password authentication, the various, layered roles are protected by passwords. The Luna Network HSM also provides password-protected appliance roles to access the Luna Shell (LunaSH) and configure the appliance and the HSM via SSH or a local serial connection (see ["Appliance Administration" on page 37](#)). Refer to ["User Access Control" on page 39](#) for descriptions of specific HSM roles and their responsibilities.

## Authentication

Objects on the HSM are encrypted by the owner of each application partition, and can be decrypted and accessed only by means of the specific secret (password) associated with the Crypto Officer or Crypto User.

If you cannot present the secret (the password) that encrypted the objects, then the HSM is just a secure storage device to which you have no access, and those objects might as well not exist.

**NOTE** The administrative role secret is also the application-authentication secret: one plain-text secret used for two purposes. On a password-authenticated HSM, once the administrator (Crypto Officer or Crypto User) has distributed the secret to the application(s), the only way to restrict access by applications (or personnel) that have come into possession of that secret is to change the password - which also changes the authentication for the associated role.

## Advantages

Using password authentication has the following advantages:

- > Convenience: changing passwords and authentication secrets is easy in the case of personnel changes or suspected compromise
- > Direct mapping to organizational policies: password change policies already existing in an organization are easy to map onto a password-authenticated framework

## Disadvantages


Passwords are less secure than multifactor quorum authentication, and thus have the following disadvantages:

- > Vulnerability to observation: passwords being typed can be easily observed in person, through a camera, or with malware like keystroke loggers
- > Record-keeping: secure passwords are obscure and must be written, with its record securely stored
- > Accountability: it is difficult to know who might have seen or been told a password


## Multifactor Quorum Authentication

For Luna HSMs configured for multifactor quorum authentication, the various, layered HSM roles are protected by cryptographic secrets stored on physical USB PED keys, each of which may be assigned a memorized PIN, presented to the HSM using the Luna PED (PIN Entry Device). The connection between the Luna PED and the Luna HSM is a secure, trusted path. The Luna Network HSM also provides password-protected appliance roles to access the Luna Shell (LunaSH) and configure the appliance and the HSM via SSH or a local serial connection (see "[Appliance Administration](#)" on page 37). Refer to "[User Access Control](#)" on page 39 for descriptions of specific roles and their responsibilities.


- > For the Luna Network HSM, the PED connection is on the appliance rear panel.



- > For the Luna PCIe HSM, the PED connection is a slot-edge connector, directly on the HSM card, accessible at the exterior of a tower or server computer (not through the host computer).



- > For the Luna USB HSM 7, the Luna PED is not required. PED keys are presented directly to the HSM via the USB-C connector and an adapter, and PINs are entered using the built-in touchscreen. You can also authenticate roles on the Luna USB HSM 7 using a Remote Luna PED connection.



For Local PED, the connection is a secure physical link, directly to the HSM, bypassing the computer memory and bus. At no time does an authentication secret exist in the clear, anywhere in computer memory or on any computer bus.

## Remote Luna PED

By default, Luna PED is connected directly to the HSM via a USB cable. When it is not convenient to be physically near the host or client computer, Remote Luna PED allows you to operate the HSM remotely and securely.

The multifactor quorum-authenticated Luna HSM generates a unique Remote PED Vector and saves it on one or more orange PED keys. You can generate or regenerate this secret at any stage of your HSM deployment. If the HSM is not yet initialized, you can generate the RPV remotely using a one-time password. If the HSM is already initialized, the HSM SO must log in and generate the RPV using a locally-connected Luna PED. The RPV is used to authenticate the Remote PED server (a client computer with a Luna PED connected) for all future HSM role authentication processes, and the HSM itself can be located at a secure facility for its entire deployment.

## Partition Activation and Challenge Secrets

Once initialized, a multifactor quorum-authenticated application partition can be configured to accept a password string, known as a challenge secret, as a secondary form of authentication. This is referred to as partition activation. For some use cases, such as key vaulting, the requirement to present a physical key to access objects on the partition may be desired. For most application use cases, however, requiring a physical key each time the application accesses the partition is impractical.

Activation allows the Crypto Officer or Crypto User PED key secrets to be cached, and for those users to authenticate their roles from then on using the secondary challenge secret. Activation is allowed or disallowed by the setting of partition policies by the Partition Security Officer (PO). The PO role cannot be activated; the PO must always log in using a physical PED key.

## Auto-Activation

In the event of a restart or power outage, activated roles are deactivated and must re-authenticate by presenting the PED key and challenge secret. Auto-activation stores the cached PED key secrets for two hours in this event, so activation will survive any maintenance shut-down or reboot, or a power outage less than two hours in duration. Auto-activation is enabled by a separate partition policy.

## Advantages

Using multifactor quorum authentication has the following advantages:

- > Security: no written record of the secret or password exists, so it cannot be compromised
- > Tracking: access and handling of physical devices (PED keys) can be tracked and controlled
- > Duplication restrictions: duplication and promulgation can be prevented by physical security measures
- > Physical device: using the Luna PED or Luna USB HSM 7 touchscreen to input passwords and PINs prevents key-logging exploits that typed passwords are vulnerable to

## Disadvantages

PED keys are physical items that can be lost or misplaced, unlike passwords, and thus have the following disadvantages:

- > Password change policies: scheduled or mandated password-change cycles in an organization can be logistically intensive when HSMs share PED key secrets
- > Inconvenience: handling of secrets requires hands-on, physical action by personnel to perform changes of authentication secrets in case of compromise

# CHAPTER 6: Appliance Administration

There are several ways to access to your Luna Network HSM appliance to perform administrative operations, depending on what works best for you and your organization. They include:

- > **Luna Shell (LunaSH):** a custom command-line interface that can be accessed by using any SSH-capable utility.
- > **Luna REST API:** a secure web application that can perform many LunaSH functions via scriptable REST APIs.
- > **Thales Crypto Command Center:** a web-based application that provides separate administrative and application owner interfaces.

The LunaSH command line interface is the standard secure interface with which you can perform operations on your HSM. It creates a secure administration channel for administrative sessions only. The REST API is specifically tailored for the management of your appliance, and does not allow applications to perform cryptographic operations. Crypto Command Center is a web-based application that facilitates rapid service provisioning and deployment. Each of these administrative interfaces allows you to efficiently manage your appliance in different ways.

For detailed instructions on using the LunaSH command line, see [About the LunaSH Command Reference](#).

For the REST API, see [REST API References](#).

For the Thales Crypto Command Center application, refer to [the CCC product documentation](#).

## Appliance Management

---

The Luna Network HSM appliance comes equipped with features that prevent attackers from stealing your proprietary information. Some of these features need to be maintained for maximum protection, and doing so is simple and efficient.

### Physical Maintenance

Physical maintenance, such as replacing power supplies and fans, does not require you to turn off your HSM. This allows you to continue working, and return to the appliance as you left it once you finish maintenance.

### Appliance Roles and Users

Appliance roles, users, and time are configured independently from the HSM inside the appliance. This separation of duties is beneficial to keeping a secure environment and to easily delegate responsibilities to personnel as you wish.

When you log in to the Luna appliance via LunaSH, the default IDs are **admin** which requires the admin password, **operator**, which requires the operator password, or **monitor** which requires the monitor password. You can also create custom named roles with the privileges of each of these IDs, or access to a subset of specific commands only.

As the appliance **admin**, you can connect and log in locally, via a serial terminal, or remotely via SSH. With no further authentication, **admin** can perform general, appliance-level administration (not accessing the HSM), and can run `view/list/show/display` commands on the HSM that do not make changes. Admin sees the full available command set, while **operator**, **monitor**, and custom users see only subsets that allow them use or read-only access to the appliance respectively.

## Appliance Authentication

If any administrative user attempts an HSM command that needs authentication, the interface prompts for that authentication. On multifactor quorum-authenticated systems, you are directed to the Luna PED, which prompts for PED keys and keypad actions.

The way you manage and configure your appliance is flexible, adapting to your needs.

# CHAPTER 7: User Access Control

The security of an HSM and its cryptographic contents depends on well-controlled access to that HSM. A controlled access policy is defined by:

- > the set of users with valid login credentials for the appliance, the HSM and the application partition
- > the actions each user is allowed to perform when logged in (the user's role)

For example, an access policy that adheres to the PKCS#11 standard requires two roles: the security officer (SO), who administers the user account(s), and the standard user, who performs cryptographic operations. When a user logs in to the HSM, they can perform only those functions that are permitted for their role.

Access to Luna Network HSM is controlled through an enhanced version of the PKCS#11 hierarchy of roles, assigned to different users in your organization. Each role allows its user to execute a different set of commands to perform specialized tasks at one of the following levels:

## Appliance-Level Users and Roles

Luna Network HSM consists of an HSM inside a secure appliance with a hardened operating system (accessed via the LunaSH command-line interface). Administration of the appliance (including network setup, file management, and system logging) is considered separate from administration of the HSM and its cryptographic functions. This separation of duties is essential to a secure environment and it allows you to easily delegate responsibilities to personnel.

Although appliance-level roles are not security roles as defined in the PKCS#11 standard, they do provide an additional level of security by requiring that the user be logged in to the appliance before they can log in to the HSM.

When one of the default appliance roles is logged in to LunaSH on the appliance, only the commands available to that role are visible. A user with **admin**-level access can create custom user roles to limit access to specified commands and operations.

**Table 1: Default Appliance Roles**

Role	Function
<b>admin</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>&gt; Can perform all administrative and configuration tasks on the appliance</li><li>&gt; With the HSM Security Officer credential, can perform all HSM administrative tasks</li><li>&gt; Activates other optional appliance roles and sets/resets their passwords</li><li>&gt; Creates custom users and roles with access to a specified subset of commands</li><li>&gt; Creates NTLS connections between the Luna Network HSM appliance and Luna HSM Clients</li></ul>
<b>operator</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>&gt; Can perform administrative tasks on the appliance, except for some configuration tasks</li><li>&gt; With the HSM Security Officer credential, can perform some basic HSM administration tasks</li><li>&gt; Cannot execute any commands that affect other roles on the appliance</li></ul>

Role	Function
<b>monitor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Executes commands that present information about the appliance and HSM</li> <li>&gt; Cannot affect the state or contents of the appliance or HSM</li> </ul>
<b>audit</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Initializes the Auditor role on the HSM</li> <li>&gt; With the Auditor credential, manages HSM audit logging</li> </ul>

### Cluster Member Role Synchronization

Keyrings and their contents are synchronized across all members of the cluster, so any member can be queried by client applications for cryptographic operations. Appliance user accounts are also synchronized via the cluster, so users with **admin**, **operator**, and **monitor** privileges can log in to any member. In a cluster with two or more members, the users/roles configuration stored in the cluster are taken as the authority -- if an appliance with custom users/roles joins the cluster, they are overwritten by the users/roles stored in the cluster. This ensures that all cluster members have the same authorized users, and that those users can log in to any individual cluster member.

### HSM-Level Roles

HSM roles are responsible for administration, configuration, and auditing of the HSM within the Luna Network HSM appliance. After logging in to LunaSH with the appropriate appliance-level role, you can access commands available to the HSM roles. HSM-level roles cannot perform cryptographic operations on the application partition.

**Table 2: HSM Roles**

<b>HSM Security Officer (SO)</b> <b>PED Key: Blue</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Initializes the HSM, creating the SO credential</li> <li>&gt; Creates/deletes the application partition</li> <li>&gt; Configures global HSM policies</li> <li>&gt; Performs updates of the HSM firmware and appliance software</li> <li>&gt; Must have <b>admin</b>-level access to the appliance to perform all HSM tasks</li> </ul>
<b>Auditor (AU)</b> <b>PED Key: White</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Manages HSM audit logging</li> <li>&gt; Must have <b>audit</b>-level access to the appliance to perform auditing tasks</li> </ul>

### Partition-Level Roles

Partition-level roles are responsible for administration and configuration of the application partition, and using the partition to perform cryptographic functions. Partition roles log in using LunaCM, or supply their credentials via crypto applications. An application partition acts as its own virtual HSM, and has its own set of roles.



**Table 3: Partition Roles**

<b>Partition Security Officer (PO)</b> <b>PED Key: Blue</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Initializes the partition, creating the PO credential and setting the cloning domain</li> <li>&gt; Initializes the Crypto Officer role and can reset the CO credential (if permitted by HSM policy)</li> <li>&gt; Configures partition policies</li> </ul>
<b>Crypto Officer (CO)</b> <b>PED Key: Black</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Creates and modifies cryptographic objects on the partition</li> <li>&gt; Manages backup and restore operations for the partition</li> <li>&gt; Performs cryptographic functions via user applications</li> <li>&gt; Creates and configures HA groups</li> <li>&gt; Initializes the Crypto User role and can reset the CU credential</li> </ul>
<b>Crypto User (CU)</b> <b>PED Key: Gray</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Performs cryptographic functions via user applications (optional read-only role)</li> <li>&gt; Can create public objects only</li> <li>&gt; Can perform backup/restore of public objects on the partition</li> </ul>

## Keyring Roles

Each keyring has two roles that are analogous to the Partition Security Officer and Crypto Officer roles on a standard Luna partition. They are referred to here as:


- > **Keyring Security Officer (KRSO)**: initially set by the Partition Security Officer for the partition that created the cluster
- > **Keyring Crypto Officer (KRCO)**: performs cryptographic operations on the keyring

Unlike standard Luna partitions, role separation between the KRSO and KRCO roles is not enforced. Separation is enforced, however, between the keyring roles and the cluster security officer (PO of the partition where the cluster's SMK is stored).

# CHAPTER 8: Capabilities and Policies

HSMs, and partitions within them, are characterized by capabilities that are set at the factory, or added by means of capability updates, and that are adjusted by means of settable policies that correspond to some of the capabilities. HSM capabilities, and the HSM policies that derive from them, apply HSM-wide. Application partition capabilities, and the application partition policies that derive from them, can be inherited from the HSM, or control characteristics that make sense only at the application partition level. "Capability and Policy Inheritance" below illustrates an example of how capabilities and policies can be inherited from the HSM-level to the partition-level on a Luna HSM.

**Figure 5: Capability and Policy Inheritance**



All policies have an equivalent capability, but not all capabilities are matched by a policy that allows adjustment of the capability. The HSM Security Officer is responsible for setting up the HSM with capabilities, but it is up to the Partition SO to enable their corresponding policies.

Some policy settings are numerical values that can be increased or decreased. Most policy settings are simply OFF/ON switches. Policy setting requires that the SO be logged in. For HSM-wide policies, that is the HSM SO. For partition-level policies, that is the Partition SO.

## Set Policies

Set policies with the `hsm changepolicy` command or the `partition changepolicy` command, as appropriate. The command requires that you identify the policy number that is to change, and the new value it is to hold. For OFF/ON policies, the value is set as zero or one, respectively.


### Example: Cloning

The cloning operation allows you to duplicate or copy the contents of your HSM or partition to other HSMs or partitions that share a cloning domain. The HSM capability that controls cloning on your HSM is Enable Cloning. The equivalent HSM Policy, Allow Cloning, is the modifiable switch that turns cloning on or off for your specific HSM.

**NOTE** Turning cloning ON or OFF is destructive, and resets your HSM. Ensure that you decide early on in your configuration whether or not you will be using this capability.

"Cloning Capability Inheritance" below shows how the cloning capability is inherited by partitions within your HSM, depending on whether you turn it on or off when you set its policy value.

**Figure 6: Cloning Capability Inheritance**



If cloning is not allowed HSM-wide, then no partition on the HSM will be able to use cloning.

If cloning is allowed HSM-wide, then each partition inherits that capability and can independently decide whether it wants to enable it.

# CHAPTER 9: Flexible Backups

While some applications might deal in ephemeral objects that are erased after their use, in many Luna HSM applications the keys and objects within the HSM and partition have value and are meant to persist. For such valuable data, any security regime requires that the data be backed up in secure fashion, and stored securely.

Backup and restore operations require access to the objects in your partition in order to copy them. As such, backup and restore operations are restricted to HSMs that share a cloning domain and partitions whose administrators allow access to.

## Backup

Backup operations copy the secure material on your HSM and store it on a separate Backup HSM. Backup is not performed continuously. The frequency of backup is dependent on your backup plan or strategy.

The Luna Backup HSM 7 or Luna Backup HSM G5 can be connected to the Luna Network HSM appliance or the Luna HSM Client to perform backup or restore operations on the spot. It is not able to perform cryptographic operations; it functions only in its secure backup/restore role. The Backup HSM takes on the authentication type of the primary HSM with which it is paired for backup - so it becomes a password-authenticated Backup HSM when backing up a password-authenticated primary HSM, and a multifactor quorum-authenticated Backup HSM when backing up a multifactor quorum-authenticated primary HSM.

The Backup HSM can also be connected to a host computer, located at a distance from the source HSM, and can perform backup and restore operations over secure network connection. This is normally the case when the source HSM is kept in a secure server room or a lights-out facility.

There are several ways to do backup with Luna HSMs. Depending on the type and number of HSMs and partitions you have, and how they are organized, different methods may be more suitable for your situation. The following sections describe these methods in more detail:

- > ["Local Backup" below](#)
- > ["Remote Backup" on the next page](#)
- > ["Comparing Local Versus Remote Backup" on page 46](#)

## Restore

Restore operations are only necessary if there is no hope of recovering your data on your HSM, and using your backup to restore the content is the only solution. The restore operation is identical to the backup operation, only in the opposite direction.


## Local Backup

Local backup requires a direct connection to the HSM to be successful. Backup can be done directly from the secure appliance housing the HSM or from a client workstation connected to the HSM.

## Centralized Local Backup

Centralized backup uses a direct connection between the HSM you wish to back up and the Backup HSM. "[Centralized Local Backup](#)" below outlines the basic setup required for simple local backup.

**Figure 7: Centralized Local Backup**




Connecting your Backup HSM directly to the HSM or secure appliance housing the HSM you wish to back up is a highly secure method of copying your keys. It requires you to have physical access to the HSM in addition to the HSM SO and Partition SO credentials for every partition needing backup. The backup operation is initiated from the LunaSH command line.

## Client-side Local Backup

Client-side backup connects to the HSM you wish to back up via your client workstation. The Backup HSM connects directly to the client workstation to perform backup. "[Client-side Local Backup](#)" below outlines the basic setup required for local backup via client workstation.


**Figure 8: Client-side Local Backup**



The backup operation in this case is still local, and thus requires a direct wired connection between your Backup HSM and client workstation. This method is highly secure, and allows for some flexibility in case the HSM you wish to back up is not easily available for direct connection. A PC running Luna HSM Client and LunaCM can connect to the HSM and, with the appropriate Partition SO credentials for every partition needing backup, can access and securely copy your cryptographic keys.

## Remote Backup

Remote backup allows you to securely back up your HSM from any location that is convenient. A secure network connection facilitated by RBS enables you to access your HSM or partition without needing to be physically near it. "[Remote Backup](#)" on the next page outlines the basic setup required for remote backup.

**Figure 9: Remote Backup**

Remote Backup Service (RBS) runs on a system hosting a Luna Backup HSM, making the Backup HSM available to distant HSMs. This allows backup and restore operations to run from any location most convenient for the administrator. In this configuration, backup and restore operations are performed over secure network connection.

## Comparing Local Versus Remote Backup

Regardless of whether you use a local connection to backup and restore your HSM, or whether you use a remote one, backup and restore operations always require a Backup HSM. How you decide to connect it and organize your backup/restore infrastructure depends on what your organization needs.

Local backup is easier and faster to configure than remote, but the remote option allows more secure storage of your cryptographic material in case the entire environment in which your HSM resides collapses.

For detailed instructions on carrying out backup and restore operations, see [Partition Backup and Restore](#).

## Cluster Backup/Restore

When Luna Network HSM is configured as a cluster, the entire contents of the cluster can be backed up to the appliance in an encrypted file, accessible to the **admin** user. You can perform backups on demand, or schedule periodic backups and determine how many to store before the oldest ones are overwritten. You can restore the entire cluster from a backup at any time. See [Cluster Backup and Restore](#) for procedures.

# CHAPTER 10: Logging and Reporting

Luna Network HSM allows you to track and report all activity on your HSM to encourage responsibility, ensure accountability, and upkeep tight security.

Luna HSMs come equipped with HSM-level audit logging via Audit role. See "[HSM-Level Audit Logging](#)" below.

The Luna Network HSM also includes appliance-side audit logging and services that monitor your HSM's performance. See "[Appliance-Level Performance Monitoring](#)" below.

## HSM-Level Audit Logging

Monitoring HSM activity is essential to maintaining a high level of security for the highly sensitive material on your HSM. Luna HSMs have logging and reporting abilities to support this. These features are implemented in the HSM firmware for maximum security.

### Logging

Secure logging is done at the whole HSM level. The HSM stores a record of past operations that is suitable for security audit review. Audit logging sends HSM log event records to a secure database on the local file system, with cryptographic safeguards ensuring verifiability, continuity, and reliability of HSM event log files.

Each log entry indicates what event occurred when, and who initiated it. Critical events are logged automatically.

### Audit Management

For circumstances that require more comprehensive review of events taking place on the HSM, an HSM-level Audit role (White PED key for multifactor quorum-authenticated HSMs) can be used. Each HSM has a unique Audit role whose purpose is to manage audits and monitor HSM activity.

The Audit role is independent from the other roles on the HSM. Creating the Audit role does not require the presence of the HSM SO and if the Audit role is initialized, the HSM and partition administrators are prevented from working with the log files. Only the Auditor can add failures, successes, key usage, and other events to the HSM logging procedure.

Audit log integrity is ensured against altering log records. Separating logging and its role from other administrative roles protects critical information related to the operations of your HSM.

## Appliance-Level Performance Monitoring

Luna HSMs monitor their own conditions for issues that might require administrative attention. Appliance-side logging of HSM activity moves HSM logging directly into the appliance file system. The purpose is to record HSM operations while bypassing the resource-heavy in-HSM log security features. Like at the HSM-level, appliance-level logging and auditing are split into separate services and roles. Only the Auditor on the appliance can engage in audit management. The Audit role is separate from Admin, Operator, and Monitor.

Appliance performance monitoring can be done via LunaSH, Thales Crypto Command Center, or Luna REST API. LunaSH allows you to specify commands yourself, while the latter two provide a friendly user interface to query the appliance.

**Syslog**

Syslog is a standard logging facility that writes messages it gets from the appliance to organized log files.

When a sensor reading on the appliance changes by an amount that crosses a configured threshold, the appliance will generate log messages according to their severity. These logs can be checked and accessed by an audit user.

**SNMP**

Luna HSMs also support remote monitoring of conditions on a local HSM via SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol). Should the condition of your HSM change in a way that requires your attention, SNMP will alert you via trap notification. Condition changes can include changes in memory or CPU usage, network connection status, and some environmental variables.

You can configure SNMP according to your organization's preferences; it is a flexible and optional feature. SNMP is secure and efficient, ensuring that faults in your HSM are detected early and that your cryptographic information remains safe.



# CHAPTER 11: Functionality Modules

Functionality Modules (FMs) consist of your own custom-developed code, loaded into and operating within the logical and physical security of a Luna HSM as part of the HSM firmware. FMs allow you to customize your Luna HSM's functionality to suit the needs of your organization. Custom functionality provided by your own FMs can include the following:

- > new cryptographic algorithms, including Quantum algorithms
- > security-sensitive code, isolated from the rest of the HSM environment
- > keys and critical parameters managed by the FM, independent from standard PKCS#11 objects, held in tamper-protected persistent storage

To create FMs, you will need the Functionality Module Software Development Kit (FM SDK), which is included with the Luna HSM Client software.

See [About the FM SDK Programming Guide](#) and [Functionality Modules](#) for details and procedures.

**NOTE** This feature requires minimum [Luna Network HSM Appliance Software 7.4.0](#), [Luna HSM Firmware 7.4.0](#) and [Luna HSM Client 7.4.0](#).

This feature has hardware dependencies described in [Preparing the Luna Network HSM to Use FMs](#).